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“Aggressive game playing is done only by out-and-out crooks . . .
and by firms in extreme financial distress.”
Brealey, Myers, and Allen (2014), p.464.
1. Introduction
In a seminal paper, Jensen and Meckling (1976) hypothesize that managers acting in sharehold-
ers’ best interest have an incentive to substitute safer for riskier assets, with the incentive being
stronger in high distress-risk situations (see also Black and Scholes, 1973). However, despite this
“risk-shifting” hypothesis being well-known and thoroughly theoretically developed,1 it has
remained elusive to find empirical evidence suggesting that the managers of industrial firms
risk-shift. Only very recently, a small number of studies, including Becker and Strömberg
(2012), Gilje (2016), and Favara et al. (2017), have made steps into this direction. While these
studies show that high distress risk sometimes causes the managers of industrial firms to take
on more risk, they offer only limited evidence on whether this behavior hurts creditors. Thus,
while their evidence suggests risk-taking, it does not necessarily imply risk-shifting.
In our paper, we offer evidence that the managers of some industrial firms not only raise
their firms’ risk, but also hurt their creditors in response to exogenous distress risk increases,
suggesting that these managers risk-shift. To do so, we assume that a firm can be viewed as a
portfolio of operating segments, with managers deliberately altering the portfolio through their
expansion and contraction decisions. To estimate the risk of this portfolio, we use Markowitz’s
(1952) portfolio variance formula, calculating the weights in that formula using either the book
values (yielding a proxy for total firm risk) or the capital expenditures of the operating segments
(yielding a proxy for the risk of the new real-assets invested into over a year). We next calculate
1See, for example, Smith and Warner (1979), Gavish and Kalay (1983), Green (1984), Green and Talmor
(1986), Campbell and Kracaw (1990), Leland (1998), and Chen et al. (2014).
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the variance-covariance terms in the formula using the returns of pure-play firm industry
portfolios containing only firms exclusively operating in the segments’ industries. Assuming
that managers are more able to change the weights than the variance-covariance terms, we
keep the variance-covariance terms constant in all our calculations, ensuring that variations in
the risk proxies reflect deliberate managerial decisions about firm risk. To also make inferences
about investment efficiency, we follow Shin and Stulz (1998) and Dittmar and Shivdasani
(2003) and calculate each segment’s average-Q as the average of the market-to-book ratio
taken over all pure-play firms exclusively operating in a segment’s industry.
To study the causal effects of distress risk on our analysis variables, we use hurricane strikes
as exogenous shock to distress risk, relying on two identification contrasts in a triple differences
(“DIDID”) setup. Hurricane strikes fulfill most conditions to be a valid instrument for distress
risk. In particular, (i) most firms are exposed to them (Dailey et al., 2009); (ii) their incidences
and paths are almost impossible to predict (Emanuel and Zhang, 2016); and (iii) they cause
severe economic damages. Also, while the public and private sector offer insurance against
losses arising from hurricane strikes, only about half of all firms with a significant exposure
to hurricane strikes take out such policies (Henry et al., 2013). In accordance, the Insurance
Information Institute (“iii”) reports that insured hurricane losses make up slightly less than
half of overall hurricane losses over the 1980-2015 period.2,3 Thus, our first identification
contrast is between hurricane-struck firms and non-hurricane-struck firms.
2See the figure titled “Tropical Storms and Hurricanes in the North Atlantic, 1980-2015,” available from
the URL address: <https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-us-catastrophes>.
3It is well known that economic agents tend to underinsure against catastrophes. For example, O’Doherty
and Smith (1993) offer case-study evidence that British Petroleum self-insures against catastrophes. Froot
(2001) shows that reinsurance firms tend to insure less than 30% of their catastrophic losses. Garmaise
and Moskowitz (2009) report that only about 35% of properties located in areas prone to earthquakes take
out earthquake insurance. The dominant view is that the low catastrophe insurance rates are the result of
excessively high catastrophe insurance premia, possibly driven by a limited supply of insurance capital and
the market power of the few firms able to offer insurance against catastrophes (see Froot, 2001).
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One condition for valid instruments that is, however, likely to be violated by hurricane strikes
is that they must affect our analysis variables only through increasing distress risk, and not
through other channels. This condition would, for example, be violated if hurricane strikes also
affected a firm’s future prospects or labor relations, leading managers to readjust their firms’
asset mixes for non-distress-risk reasons. To mitigate confounding effects arising through other
channels, we use a second identification contrast between pre-hurricane-strike healthy and
distressed firms. Given that theory suggests that healthy firms have (almost) no incentive to
risk-shift, this second contrast should difference out effects other than distress risk. While we
acknowledge that healthy and distressed firms differ in absolute terms, parallel trends tests
suggest they observe similar changes in key variables over the pre-hurricane-strike period. More
importantly, we also repeat our tests on a matched sample, ensuring that the healthy and
distressed firms have a similar size, age, asset tangibility, and industry composition.
Our evidence suggests that hurricane strikes induce the managers of moderately distressed
(“ailing”) firms to skew their firms’ asset mixes towards higher-risk segments. In contrast, if
anything, they induce the managers of highly distressed (“distressed”) firms to skew their
firms’ asset mixes towards lower-risk segments. Our univariate analysis, for example, suggests
that, while the ailing firms significantly increase the risks of their operating segment portfolio
(“firm risk”) and new real-assets portfolio (“investment risk”) by about 1.2 percentage points
in response to a hurricane strike, the distressed firms insignificantly decrease theirs by 0.3 and
0.1 points, respectively.4 In comparison, healthy non-hurricane-struck firms observe increases
of about 0.2 points over matched periods. While the increases in risk observed by the ailing
hurricane-struck firms may appear economically low, our risk proxies are far less volatile than,
for example, the volatilities of real stock-portfolios. Thus, contrary to appearances, the increases
in the risk proxies are actually above the 90th percentiles of the full-sample distributions of
4While the decreases in risk observed by the distressed firms are insignificant in our univariate analysis,
they sometimes become significant in our regression analysis including control variables.
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changes in the risk proxies, suggesting that they are economically meaningful.
Further tests reveal that the risk changes of the ailing and distressed firms are spurred by
these firms restructuring themselves. The ailing firms, for example, tend to change their business
orientation and close segments, with the probability of them changing their main segment
rising by twelve percentage points and them closing one-fifth of a segment on average. Crucially,
however, the ailing firms do not close segments to start hoarding (risk-free) cash. Further,
they also do not become more likely to act as acquirer or target in a mergers and acquisitions
(M&A) deal. In comparison, while the distressed firms also tend to change their business
orientation, our evidence suggests that they do not change their number of segments. Overall,
if the intention of the ailing hurricane-struck firms is to risk-shift, it is perhaps unsurprising
that they do so through closing segments, since it is probably faster to close than to open a
segment and the firms probably face some urgency to act. More surprising, however, is that
the risk-shifting would not be facilitated through M&A activity, suggesting it is not always
possible to use M&A activity to study risk-shifting (e.g., Acharya, Amihud, and Litov, 2011).
Our evidence so far suggests that the managers of ailing firms raise their firms’ risk after
a hurricane strike. This behavior would, however, only translate into risk-shifting if it hurt
creditors. To establish that it does, we first show that the higher risk of the ailing hurricane-
struck firms is the result of poor investments into segments with low growth opportunities (low
average-Qs), while the lower risk of the distressed hurricane-struck firms is the result of good
investments into segments with high growth opportunities (high average-Qs). For example,
while the average-Q of the ailing firms’ new real-assets portfolio significantly decreases by
0.33 after a hurricane strike, the average-Q of the distressed firms’ new real-assets portfolio
significantly increases by 0.34. We next show that the risk-taking behavior of the ailing firms
significantly raises their chance to fail over the next ten years, with them being six percentage
points more likely to fail over that period than the distressed hurricane-struck firms. In contrast,
ailing non-hurricane-struck firms are ten percentage points less likely to fail than distressed
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non-hurricane-struck firms over matched periods. Both the poor investment decisions and the
abnormally high failure risk of the ailing firms lower the chance that these firms are able to
fully repay their creditors in the future. Thus, they hurt the firms’ creditors.
One final piece of evidence suggesting that the ailing firms do not act in creditors’ best
interest can be deduced from studying why the ailing and distressed firms respond so differently
to hurricane strikes. In a seminal paper, Chava and Roberts (2008) show that creditors restrict
managerial decision-making in firms violating financial covenants. In accordance, Gilje (2016)
shows that creditor control facilitated through covenant violations explains why oil and gas
firms reduce risk in response to exogenous increases in distress risk. Thus, if our ailing firms were
significantly less likely to be under creditor control than our distressed firms, creditor control
may explain the different reactions of the two types of firms. To verify this hypothesis, we first
show that covenant violations are far less common among ailing than distressed firms. More
importantly, however, we also split the sample of ailing firms into covenant compliers and
covenant violators. We then offer evidence that, while the compliers raise their risk when hit by
a hurricane, the violaters lower theirs. Given that the subsample of violators reveals creditors’
preferred response to hurricane-strike-induced distress risk increases, it follows that the risk-
taking of the ailing compliers must be suboptimal from creditors’ perspective.
Our work contributes to the empirical risk-shifting literature. While a large number of
studies suggest that distress risk prompts financial firms to risk-shift,5 the evidence on whether
distress risk prompts industrial firms to do the same is more sparse. In the early literature on
5Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) and Laeven and Levine (2009) show that financial deregulation
raises the volatilities, market betas, and distress risk of stockholder-controlled banks. Esty (1997a) shows that
savings and loan associations increased their asset risk in the 1980s and 1990s. Esty (1997b) offers case study
evidence corroborating these results. Relying on fund volatilities and tracking errors, Brown, Harlow, and
Starks (1996), Brown, Goetzmann, and Park (2001), and Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro (2007) show that poor
performance leads mutual funds and hedge funds to risk-shift. Using an asset-holding based proxy, Huang,
Clemens, and Hanjiang (2011) offer further evidence that mutual funds risk-shift.
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industrial firms, Andrade and Kaplan (1998) find no evidence that firms ending up in distress
after leveraged re-capitalizations take on more risk. Surveying U.S. and Dutch chief financial
officers (CFOs), Graham and Harvey (2001) and DeJong and VanDijk (2007) find that the
CFOs attach little importance to risk-shifting. Using structural-model implied asset volatilities
to proxy for firm risk, Fang and Zhong (2004) and Larsen (2006) obtain the surprising finding
that risk-taking is U-shaped in distress risk. Conversely, Eisdorfer (2008) offers theoretical
evidence that the incentive to risk-shift induces distressed, but not healthy, firms to speed up
investments in response to an increase in uncertainty. In accordance, he finds that regressions
of firm-level investment on aggregate volatility produce a negative relation for healthy firms,
but a positive relation for distressed firms. Extending his research, Pryshchepa, Aretz, and
Banerjee (2013) show that it is the distressed firms that are not yet identified as distressed
(e.g., those still in compliance with their covenants) that produce the positive relation.
Closer to our work, recent studies use exogenous shocks to study whether distress risk leads
industrial firms to take on more risk. Becker and Strömberg (2012) study a legal change in
U.S. fiduciary duties forcing managers to keep creditors’ interests in mind in high distress-risk
situations. They find that the change decreases the equity- and return-on-assets-volatilities
of distressed, but surprisingly also healthy, firms. Similarly, Favara et al. (2017) show that
bankruptcy reforms reducing the incentive to risk-shift lead to decreases in the equity volatilities
of distressed firms relative to healthy firms. Given that these studies offer only limited evidence
suggesting that the risk-taking found by them reduces firm value and thus amounts to risk-
shifting,6 we contribute to them by showing that the risk-taking found by us is attributable to
value-reducing managerial decisions. Using the ratio of high risk (“exploratory”) projects to
6Becker and Strömberg (2012) show that the equity values of firms with low to moderate leverage ratios
increase, while those of firms with high leverage ratios decrease, in response to the change in fiduciary duties,
which is consistent with risk-shifting. The decreases in the equity values of the firms with high leverage ratios
are, however, insignificant, so that we can draw only limited inferences from them. Favara et al. (2017) do not
study the value consequences of the risk-taking behavior documented by them.
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low risk (“developmental”) projects to proxy for the risk of oil and gas firms, Gilje (2016) shows
that exogenous shocks to financial leverage induce these firms to take on less risk, with the
decrease in risk being especially pronounced for covenant violators. We complement his results
by showing that, while covenant violators may not be able to raise their risk in response to
distress risk increases, covenant compliers are able to do so, at least in our setting.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our analysis variables. In Section 3,
we describe our methodology. Section 4 outlines our data sources. Section 5 offers our empirical
results. Section 6 reports the results from robustness tests. Section 7 concludes.
2. Analysis Variables
In this section, we introduce our analysis variables. We first describe how we estimate the risks
of a firm’s operating segment portfolio and its new real-assets portfolio. We next explain how we
extract a firm’s distress risk from Merton’s (1974) model. We finally describe the calculations of
other variables. See Table A.1 in the Appendix for more details about the variables.
2.1 Firm Risk and Investment Risk
We interpret a firm as a portfolio of operating segments, motivating us to calculate the total
risk of the firm and the risk of the new real-assets added to the firm using Markowitz’s (1952)
portfolio variance formula. Let Ais,t be the value of segment s of firm i at the end of fiscal year
t, Ai,t the sum over the values of all segments, and Si,t the number of segments. Denoting by t
∗
a higher-frequency time index than t, let rs,t∗ be the period t
∗ return of segment s. We define








Similarly, let Cis,t be the investments made into segment s of firm i over fiscal year t and Ci,t
the sum over all segment investments. We define the return of a portfolio mimicking the return







We next compute the total risk of firm i at the end of fiscal year t, FirmRisk, as the standard
deviation of rAi,t∗ , σ(r
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i,t∗), and the risk of the new real-assets invested into by the firm over that
fiscal year, InvestmentRisk, as the standard deviation of rCi,t∗ , σ(r
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i,t∗), where both standard
deviations are annualized and stated in percent. Markowitz (1952) suggests that either standard
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where w ∈ {A,C}, σ(rs,t∗)2 is the return variance of segment s, and σ(rs,t∗ , rn,t∗) is the return
covariance between segments s and n. Equation (3) shows that FirmRisk and InvestmentRisk
reflect both the volatilities of the segments in a firm’s segment portfolio (through the variance
terms), but also the co-movements between the segments (through the covariance terms).
We use a segment’s book value of assets to measure its value (Ais,t) and its capital ex-
penditures to measure investments into the segment (Cis,t). We calculate the variances and
covariances of the segments by forming stock portfolios containing only firms exclusively
operating in one single industry (“pure-play firm industry portfolios”). To this end, we first
sort firms exclusively operating in one four-digit SIC industry into four-digit SIC industry
portfolios, requiring that each portfolio contains a minimum of three firms over the entire
sample period. Using the firms from the sample of industry portfolios violating this restriction,
we sort them into three-digit SIC industry portfolios, again imposing the restriction that the
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portfolios contain a minimum of three firms. We proceed in this way until we reach one-digit
SIC industry portfolios.7 We calculate value-weighted weekly stock returns for each portfolio,
measuring weekly returns from end of Wednesday of the previous week to end of Wednesday
of the current week.8 We finally calculate the (time-invariant) variances and covariances of the
pure-play firm industry portfolios using data over the January 1977-December 2011 period
and merge the estimates with the segments based on the segment SIC codes.9
On an intuitive level, a firm’s variations in FirmRisk and InvestmentRisk reflect how the
volatilities of the firm’s operating segment portfolio and its new real-assets portfolio evolve
over time. However, because we only allow the segment, but not the pure play firm industry
portfolio, data to change over time, the variations in the risk proxies are entirely attributable
to variations in the segment weights, and not to variations in the variances and covariances of
the segments. Only allowing the segment, but not the industry portfolio, data to change over
time is consistent with our view that, while managers are able to allocate resources across
segments, they are unlikely to be able to greatly alter the risks of the segments.
FirmRisk is related to other risk proxies used in the literature. In particular, we can view the
firm-level change in FirmRisk as a continuous version of Acharya, Amihud, and Litov’s (2011)
risk-taking proxy, a dummy variable equal to one for firms engaging in focusing mergers and
7About 77% of our firm-year observations end up within four-digit SIC industry portfolios, with the
remainder ending up within either two- or three-digit portfolios.
8While asset returns better reflect asset risks, the number of unlevered stocks traded in the United States
is too low to exclusively use unlevered stocks to form the industry portfolios. In a robustness test, we later,
however, use stock returns delevered using the structural model of Merton (1974) to address the concern that
cross-industry variations in financial leverage bias our empirical conclusions.
9Since volatility clusters over time, managers may base their investment decisions on more conditional
estimates of the variances and covariances of the segments than those used in our main tests. In a previous
version of our paper, we have thus studied changes in the risk proxies calculated using variances and covariances
estimated over the twelve months of weekly returns prior to the end of fiscal year t. Despite higher estimation
errors, we found results consistent with those reported in our paper.
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zero for firms engaging in diversifying mergers. Thus, their risk-taking proxy reflects the degree
of co-movement between a firm’s core assets and its newly acquired assets. While FirmRisk
captures the same through the covariance terms in Equation (3), it also captures the absolute
risks of a firm’s assets through the variance terms in that equation, ensuring that, for example,
a high-tech firm buying a utility firm would not be considered as risk-taking.
FirmRisk is also related to the risk proxies used by Huang, Clemens, and Hanjiang (2011)
and Armstrong and Vashishtha (2012). The former authors estimate the risks of financial
firms by calculating the volatilities of the financial investments made by them. Closer to us,
the latter authors estimate the risks of industrial firms by calculating the volatilities of the
operating segment portfolios owned by them. In contrast to us, Armstrong and Vashishtha
(2012), however, allow for variations in their risk proxy attributable to both the segment
weights, but also to the variances and covariances of the segments.
2.2 Distress Risk
We use the Merton (1974) model to estimate a firm’s default probability over the twelve months
after the end of month t. To this end, we follow Vassalou and Xing (2004) and use the Black
and Scholes (1973) European call option valuation formula to calculate each firm’s asset value,
Ai,t, at the end of each trading day over the twelve months before the end of month t:
Ei,t = Ai,tN (d1;i,t)−Ki,te−rN (d2;i,t) , (4)
where Ei,t is the equity value, Ki,t the sum of short-term debt and one-half times long-term
debt, and r the annualized risk-free rate of return. Moreover, N(.) is the cumulative standard











/σi,t, and d2;i,t is d1;i,t − σi,t, where σi,t is the
annualized asset volatility. To obtain an estimate of asset volatility, we initially set asset
volatility to an estimate of stock volatility calculated from daily data over the twelve-month
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period. Using the stock volatility estimate, we then calculate a time-series of daily asset values
over that period. We finally reestimate asset volatility from the daily percent changes in the
time-series of the asset values. Using the new asset volatility estimate, we repeat the above
procedure, updating the asset volatility estimate until it converges. Upon convergence, we
plug the most recent implied asset value, the most recent value for the sum of short-term debt
and one-half times long-term debt, the annualized mean asset return, µ, and the final asset













We use Capex, Focus, NumberSegments, Cash, and AcquisitionExpense to examine how a
firm changes the risks of its operating segment portfolio and new real-assets portfolio. Capex
is capital expenditures scaled by total assets. Focus is a dummy variable equal to one if a
firm’s main operating segment, defined as the segment with the highest sales, changes its
two-digit SIC industry code over the fiscal year, and else zero. NumberSegments is the number
of operating segments owned by a firm. Cash is cash and cash equivalents scaled by total
assets. AcquisitionExpense is acquisition expenditures scaled by total assets.
To study the real consequences of the changes in risk, we analyze whether the changes
are facilitated through investments into segments with good or bad growth opportunities. To
measure growth opportunities, we follow Shin and Stulz (1998), Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003),
Datta, D’Mello, and Iskandar-Datta (2009), and Gopalan and Xie (2011). More specifically,
we calculate a segment’s average-Q as the value-weighted average of the ratio of total assets
minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity minus deferred taxes to total
assets, taken over all pure play firms operating in the segment’s industry (defined as described
above). In turn, we calculate the aggregate average-Q of a firm as the value-weighted average
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of the average-Qs of the segments owned by the firm, using either the book value of assets,
AverageQFirm, or the capital expenditures, AverageQNewAssets, of the segments to compute
the weights. We also examine data on bankruptcy filings, distressed mergers (defined as mergers
involving at least one firm with a top tercile DistressRisk value over the two years before the
merger-related delisting), and performance-related exchange delistings.
We use Assets, PP&E, and PP&E 2 as control variables in our tests. Assets is the natural
log of total assets, reported in 2010 dollars. PP&E is net property, plant, and equipment scaled
by last fiscal year’s total assets. In line with Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999), we also
use PP&E 2, the square of PP&E, to allow for non-linearities in the relation between firm risk
and asset tangibility. In parallel trends tests, we further include BookToMarket, defined as the
ratio of a firm’s book value of equity to its stock market capitalization.
3. The Causal Inference Tests
In this section, we offer details about the differences methodology used in our paper. We start
with explaining why hurricane strikes are likely to be a valid instrument for distress risk. We
next describe the mean-comparison and regression tests used in our empirical work.
3.1 Using Hurricane Strikes as Instrument for Distress Risk
We use distress risk increases induced through hurricane strikes to establish whether distress
risk induces industrial firms to skew their asset mixes towards riskier assets. A hurricane is a
rapidly rotating storm system (“tropical cyclone”) with sustained winds of at least 74 miles
per hour. It usually has an area of low atmospheric pressure at its center. Hurricanes spawn
in the North Atlantic or Pacific Ocean between the start of June and the end of November
(“hurricane season”). For hurricane strikes to be a valid instrument for distress risk, they must
fulfill four conditions. First, their effects must extend over a large number of U.S. areas, ruling
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Figure 1. Weather Related Disasters and Population Density, By County The figure shows the
number of weather related disasters (left panel) and population density (right panel), by U.S. county. Weather
related disasters include flooding, tropical cyclones, fire, tornadoes, and other severe storms. The data on
weather related disasters cover the 2006-2013 period and are retrieved from Environment America. The data
on population density are measured at the end of 2000 and are retrieved from NC Learn.
out the possibility that firms relocate away from hurricane-affected areas and thus ensuring
that firms are randomly assigned to treatment. Second, the origins of and paths taken by
hurricanes must be virtually impossible to predict, ruling out the possibility that firms react
to hurricane strikes before they occur, which would contaminate the pre-event period. Third,
hurricane strikes must meaningfully affect the distress risk of firms located in the struck areas
(“inclusion restriction”). Fourth, hurricane strikes must affect a firm’s risk choices only through
increasing distress risk, and not through other channels (“exclusion restriction”).
The condition that hurricanes must have an effect on a large number of U.S. areas is
likely to be fulfilled. Blake, Landsea, and Gibney (2011) show that hurricanes do not only
damage coastal regions, but also spawn storms and tornadoes damaging inland regions. In
addition, hurricanes often cause flooding due to them being accompanied by heavy rainfalls. In
accordance, Dessaint and Matray (2017) find that only about half of all U.S. counties have never
been affected by a hurricane over the last 150 years. Figure 1 shows that even fewer counties
have never been affected by weather-related disasters including, but not limited to, hurricanes.
More importantly, it further shows that counties not affected by weather-related disasters tend
to be sparsely populated, making them unattractive locations for firms to move to.
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The condition that the origins of and paths taken by hurricanes must be virtually impossible
to predict is also likely to be fulfilled. The National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR)
argues that hurricane incidences are challenging to forecast because “small-scale features
[such as minor variations in the atmosphere] either nurture or crimp a potential hurricane.”
Moreover, the National Hurricane Center (NHC) reports that around half of all five-day ahead
forecasts of a hurricane’s location are off-target by more than 200 miles.
The condition that hurricanes must significantly affect firms’ distress risk is also likely to
be fulfilled given the massive economic damages caused by hurricanes. For example, Pielke,
Wigley, and Green (2008) and Blake, Landsea, and Gibney (2011) find that Hurricane Katrina
caused an estimated property damage of $113 billion. In accordance, Property Claims Services
reports that seven out of the ten most costly U.S. catastrophes were hurricanes. Studying data
on all hurricanes and tropical storms between 1994 and 2015, they report that total insured
hurricane losses amounted to $161.2 billion or 40.8% of total insured losses. Finally, Hsiang
and Jian (2014) report that hurricanes cause long-lasting declines in economic growth.10
The problematic condition is that hurricanes must affect our analysis variables only through
increasing distress risk, but not through any other channels. This condition would be violated
if, for example, hurricanes more strongly damaged tangible assets (e.g., vehicles, machines, and
structures) than intangible assets, and tangible assets were less risky than intangible assets. In
this case, hurricane strikes would increase our first risk proxy, FirmRisk, simply because they
caused managers to write down low-risk tangible assets. More directly capturing deliberate
managerial investment decisions, our second risk proxy, InvestmentRisk, is, fortunately, immune
to effects induced through the damages caused by hurricanes. Nevertheless, both risk proxies
suffer from the problem that hurricanes affect firms along multiple dimensions. For example, a
10In Hsiang and Jian’s (2014, p.4) own words:“We find that GDP growth rates are depressed for the fifteen
years that follow a cyclone strike, causing the trajectory of long-run income to deviate significantly from its
pre-disaster trend. Within the 20 years following a cyclone there is no rebound in growth, so affected national
incomes remain permanently lower than their disaster-free counterfactuals.”
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hurricane strike may affect a firm’s product markets, labor markets, and growth opportunities,
perhaps prompting managers to rethink the firm’s business model and spurring changes in
firm risk not driven by risk-shifting considerations. In the next subsection, we describe how
our differences methodology attempts to mitigate the effects of such problems.
3.2 The Differences Methodology
We use a differences methodology similar to Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), but adjusted for
us relying on two identification contrasts instead of one, to study whether distress risk prompts
industrial firms to shift towards riskier assets. Our methodology features several, sometimes
overlapping, shock periods and several, sometimes overlapping, groups of treated firms. For
example, since both Hurricanes Ophelia and Rita spawned in 2005, they yield identical shock
periods. However, while Hurricane Ophelia struck firms in North Carolina, Hurricane Rita struck
firms in Florida, Louisiana, and Texas. For each hurricane season, our first identification contrast
is between hurricane-struck firms and non-hurricane-struck firms. Conversely, our second is
between pre-hurricane-strike healthy firms and pre-hurricane-strike distressed firms.
Starting with the first identification contrast, our treatment-firm sample contains firm-year
observations associated with firms located in a county struck by a hurricane over the four-year
period surrounding the strike (excluding the strike year).11 Denoting the strike year as year 0,
the pre-hurricane event period thus features year −2 and −1, while the post-hurricane event
period features year +1 and +2. We only study two observations before and after a strike
because Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) show that long event periods can generate
upward biased inference levels in shock-based tests. We further ensure that there is a gap of
at least five years between the hurricane strikes experienced by a treated firm. If the gap is
shorter, we study the event period generated by the first hurricane, but exclude the event period
11Coval and Moskowitz (1999) and Prinsky and Wang (2006) offer empirical evidence suggesting that the
vast majority of firms have their “locality of operations” close to their headquarters.
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generated by the second. We do so because firms struck by multiple hurricanes over short time
periods create problems for our methodology through generating overlap between the earlier
hurricane’s post-event period and the later hurricane’s pre-event period. Noteworthily, the
five-year gap ensures that our treated firms are not regularly struck, decreasing the probability
that the firms have taken significant precautionary measures against hurricanes.
For each hurricane season, we match the treated firm-year observations with firm-year
observations associated with firms located in counties not struck by hurricanes over the same
period (the control observations). To mitigate indirect effects of hurricanes, we exclude from
the matched observations those associated with firms located in the five counties closest to
each struck county.12 We use the Haversine formula (i.e., the great circle distance between
two points on a sphere given their longitudes and latitudes) to calculate the distance between
counties. Our matching choices imply that a firm can act as both treated and control, albeit
in different hurricane seasons, and that it can act as either multiple times. We define Treatedi,t
to be a dummy variable equal to one for observations associated with the hurricane-struck
firms and equal to zero for observations associated with the matched controls.
Our second identification contrast compares pre-hurricane-strike healthy firms and pre-
hurricane-strike distressed firms. Assuming that healthy firms are identical to distressed firms
except along the distress risk dimension, the second contrast differences out the effects of
hurricane strikes arising through non-distress-risk channels, mitigating the concern that our
tests violate the exclusion restriction. To classify firms according to their distress risk, we sort
them into portfolios based on their DistressRisk values at the end of the fiscal year before a
hurricane strike year. Doing so, we ensure that we only use pre-hurricane data to determine
12The indirect effects of hurricanes can be positive or negative. Competitors located in counties neighboring
a hurricane-struck county may, for example, benefit from a strike, while customers or suppliers located in
such counties may suffer. In addition, hurricane-induced damages to the infrastructure of a county, as, for
example, its roads and bridges, may also negatively affect firms in neighboring counties if those firms rely on
the infrastructure (e.g., if they have to transport their output through the hurricane-struck county).
17
treatment status. To allow for a non-linear effect of distress risk on our analysis variables, we
sort firms into three portfolios. The first portfolio contains firms with a DistressRisk value
below the sixth decile (“healthy firms”); the second portfolio contains firms with a value
between the sixth and the ninth deciles (“ailing firms”); and the third portfolio contains firms
with a value above the ninth decile (“distressed firms”).13 We use the healthy firms as control
firms. We define Healthy (Ailing) [Distressed ] to be a dummy variable equal to one if a firm
belongs to the healthy (ailing) [distressed] firm portfolio, and else zero.
A possible caveat with our second identification contrast is that healthy and distressed
firms may not only differ along the distress risk dimension, but also along other dimensions. To
alleviate this concern, we repeat our tests on a within-industry propensity-score (PS) matched
sample of healthy and distressed firms. To form the PS-matched sample, we use a logit model
of a dummy variable equal to one if a firm’s DistressRisk value is above the sixth decile and
else zero, on Size, Age, and PP&E. We estimate the logit model separately by one-digit SIC
code industry using data from the year before a hurricane strike (year − 1). We match each
above-sixth-decile DistressRisk value firm with the below-sixth-decile DistressRisk value firm
from the same one-digit SIC code industry and with the closest fitted probability.14
We start our empirical analysis with a simple comparison of mean values. To do so, we first
calculate the mean values of our analysis variables for the hurricane-struck firms (Treated = 1)
by distress risk portfolio and pre- or post-hurricane period. We next calculate the difference in
the mean values from the pre- to the post-hurricane period by distress risk portfolio. We finally
13We acknowledge that our choices for the portfolio breakpoints are adhoc. In the Internet Appendix, we
therefore show that varying the portfolio breakpoints does not change our conclusions. Interestingly, however,
raising the lower breakpoint of the ailing firms and thus boosting their distress risk significantly strengthens
our evidence that these firms take on more risk in response to exogenous distress risk increases.
14Adding other covariates to the logit model, such as FirmRisk, InvestmentRisk, and BookToMarket, does
not materially change the PS-matched sample. Neither does separately estimating the logit model by the
combination of hurricane-struck or non-hurricane-struck county and one-digit SIC code industry.
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calculate the difference in the difference from the pre- to post-hurricane period (“DID”) between
the ailing and the healthy firms or the distressed and the healthy firms. Repeating the same
steps for the non-hurricane-struck firms (Treated = 0), we calculate “counterfactual” DID
estimates. Subtracting each non-hurricane-struck firm DID estimate from its corresponding
hurricane-struck firm DID estimate, we obtain DIDID estimates. Both the DID and the DIDID
estimates allow us to assess the causal effect of distress risk on our analysis variables.
To control for other variables and firm- and year-fixed effects, we also use regressions to
calculate the DIDID estimates. Allowing the effects of the controls and the fixed effects to
vary across the healthy, ailing, and distressed firms, we write the regression model as:
AnalysisV ariablei,t = αi,k + αt,k + β
′Distressi,t × Treatedi,t × Afteri,t
+ γ ′Distressi,t × Treatedi,t + δ′Distressi,t × Afteri,t
+ η′Distressi,t ⊗Xi,t + εi,t, (6)
where AnalysisVariable is firm i’s analysis variable in year t,Distress = [1, Ailing, Distressed]′,
After is a dummy variable equal to one for the two years after a hurricane strike (i.e., year
+1 and +2), and else zero, and Xi,t is a vector of controls. ⊗ is the Kronecker product. β, γ,
δ, and η are vectors of parameters, αi,k are firm-distress risk portfolio fixed effects, αt,k are
year-distress risk portfolio fixed effects, and εi,t is the residual. We use White’s (1980) formula
to calculate standard errors.15 We can interpret the β coefficient on the triple interaction
involving Ailing as the causal effect of distress risk on the analysis variable for ailing firms. In
the same vein, we can interpret the β coefficient on the triple interaction involving Distressed
as the causal effect of distress risk on the analysis variable for distressed firms.
15Our results are robust to excluding the controls. They are also robust to replacing the firm fixed effects
with county- or state-fixed effects or clustering standard errors at the firm-, industry-, or county-level.
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4. Data Sources
We obtain market data from CRSP and accounting data (including the geographical location
of a firm’s headquarters) from Compustat. Segment data are from the Compustat Historical
Segment database. T-Bill rates are from Kenneth French’s website. The bankruptcy filing data
are from the union of SDC Platinum and bankruptcydata.com, while the performance-related
delistings data are from CRSP (delisting codes 500 or 520-584). We retrieve data on the
identity of counties struck by hurricanes, the strike dates, and the amount of total (property
and crop) damages caused by a hurricane from the Spatial Hazard and Event Losses Database
for the United States (“SHELDUS”) provided by the University of South Carolina.
We create our analysis sample as follows. We start with the observations in the Compustat
Historical Segment database over the 1991-2011 period.16 We next apply the following screening
criteria to this sample. First, we drop firm-year observations for which the difference between
the sum of a firm’s segment sales and its total sales exceeds 20%. Second, we drop non-operating
firm-year segments and reallocate their values to the values of the remaining segments on a
pro-rata basis.17 Third, we drop all firms only ever reporting information for the same single
segment. Finally, considering the sample of firms switching from one single segment to another
or from a single segment to multiple segments, we drop firm-year observations before the first
switch if the firm starts out as a single segment firm in our data. We impose the third and
fourth restrictions because single-segment firms produce a zero change in our risk proxies by
16While our sample period thus spans two segment accounting regulations, namely, SFAS 14 and SFAS
131, Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) offer evidence that the change from SFAS 14 to SFAS 131 did not
lead to significant changes in the segment structures reported by most firms.
17Non-operating segments appear either for reporting adjustment purposes or serve management (rather
than operational) purposes. We distinguish operating from non-operating segments using a textual algorithm
searching the names of the segments for the words “corporate,” “headquarters,” and “adjustments.” The
Compustat Segment database usually assigns a firm’s primary SIC code to non-operating segments, inflating
the importance of a firm’s core assets in the absence of our remedy.
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construction. We next match the segment data with Compustat data. We drop financial firms
(SIC codes: 6000-6999) and utility firms (4900-4999). We also drop firm-year observations with
missing DistressRisk or control variable values. In our differences analysis, we further drop
firms which do not have complete data over a hurricane’s event period. To alleviate the effect
of outliers, we winsorize all continuous variables at the first and 99th percentiles.
We define as hurricane-struck counties those suffering hurricane damages in excess of
$250,000 (in 2013 U.S. dollars). While the $250,000 threshold may appear low, the mean (me-
dian) damage observed by the qualifying counties is $118 million ($17 million). Also, we later
show that the qualifying hurricanes significantly raise firms’ distress risk. Finally, increasing
the damage threshold to, for example, $1 or $2 million, does not change our conclusions.
Our final sample includes 178 unique hurricane-struck firms and 7,331 not-necessarily-
unique matched control firms. The number of hurricane-struck firms is relatively low because a
large number of them do not fulfill the condition that they are not struck by other hurricanes
over the two years before the hurricane strike in event year 0.
5. Empirical Results
In this section, we present our empirical results. We first offer several real-world examples
illustrating the behavior of our risk proxies, FirmRisk and InvestmentRisk. We next report
descriptive statistics for the risk proxies and other variables. Turning to our main objective,
we finally study whether distress risk prompts industrial firms to take on more risk and, if it
does, how the firms raise their risk and whether this behavior affects their creditors.
5.1 Illustrative Examples
We first discuss several real-world examples building up intuition about the behavior of our
risk proxies. The purpose of the examples is not to showcase firms raising their risk due to an
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increase in distress risk, but to illustrate that our risk proxies can yield different conclusions
about whether a firm changes its risk compared to other proxies in the literature. For example,
in line with a logic often espoused by corporate finance textbooks, Coles, Daniel, and Naveen’s
(2006), Low’s (2009), and Kini and Williams’s (2012) risk-taking proxies implicitly assume that
a decrease in the number of operating segments always increases firm risk. In contrast, Acharya,
Amihud, and Litov’s (2011) risk-taking proxy, which we introduced in Section 2.1, implicitly
assumes that only adding segments to a firm’s segment portfolio changes firm risk.
Table 1 shows the calculations of our risk proxies for Halliburton at the end of fiscal years
2006 and 2007. Until the end of fiscal year 2006, Halliburton was a healthy diversified provider
of services and products to energy, industrial, and government customers, with six operating
segments. During fiscal year 2007, it, however, underwent a major restructuring, divesting
non-core assets and reorganizing itself into an oil and gas field services- and a drilling oil and
gas wells-segment. According to the firm’s 2007 10-K report, it did so to “improve operational
and cost management efficiencies, better serve our customers, and become better aligned with
the process of exploring for and producing from oil and natural gas wells.” Consistent with the
textbook logic described above, the reduction in the number of segments raised Halliburton’s
FirmRisk from 27.1% to 36.3% and its InvestmentRisk from 34.1% to 36.3%. The company
continued to operate in these segments until the end of our sample period.
Table 1 About Here
While the Halliburton example shows that decreases in the number of segments can increase
firm risk, we next show that our risk proxies are not necessarily negatively related to operating
diversity. For example, expanding the number of its segments from three in 1998 to five in
1999 to respond to more intense competition and new technologies, Cincinnati Bell raised
its FirmRisk from 27.6% to 35.7% and its InvestmentRisk from 27.5% to 30.2%, opposite of
what the textbook logic suggests. The higher risk was spurred by the company expanding into
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segments riskier than its original segments. The risk proxies can change even in the absence
of a change in the number of segments. For example, while owning five segments in both
1992 and 1993, Scott Technologies decreased both its firm and investment risk by about three
percentage points over that period. It did so by swapping two higher-risk segments for two
lower-risk segments to respond to a deterioration in its profitability. As a final example, while
owning the same operating segments in both 2004 and 2005, Ralph Lauren increased both
its firm and investment risk over that period by skewing its asset mix towards its higher-risk
segments to respond to strong growth in its retail business. The final example illustrates that,
different from Acharya, Amihud, and Litov’s (2011) risk-taking proxy, the identity of a firm’s
segments does not need to change for our firm or investment risk proxies to change.18
5.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 offers descriptive statistics on our risk proxies and other variables. The table suggests
that the average firm’s operating segment portfolio has a volatility of about 29.7% (FirmRisk),
while its new real-assets portfolio has a volatility of about 30.0% (InvestmentRisk), both per
annum. Because most firms only own a small number of segments, both volatility estimates
are only slightly below the corresponding value-weighted averages of the volatilities of the
segments, implying that most firms do not greatly benefit from diversification benefits (not
shown). While the median firm has an essentially zero one-year ahead default probability, the
mean firm has a default probability of about 6.7% (DistressRisk).
Table 2 About Here
The table also reports descriptive statistics for FirmRisk, InvestmentRisk, and DistressRisk
separately for the healthy, ailing, and distressed firms. These statistics demonstrate that both
18To save space, we do not offer background information on why the companies mentioned in this paragraph
changed their risk nor on what happened to them. See the Internet Appendix for this information.
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Figure 2. Changes in Firm Risk, By Distress Risk Groups The figure shows the change in mean
FirmRisk from year zero to up to ten years into the future for healthy and ailing/distressed firms. We define
as healthy (ailing/distressed) those firms with a DistressRisk value below (above) the sixth decile at the end
of year zero. The broken lines are 95% confidence bands. We first average the change in FirmRisk by group,
look-ahead period, and fiscal year and then by group and look-ahead period alone.
FirmRisk and InvestmentRisk tend to rise with distress risk, consistent with a higher distress
risk amplifying the incentive to take on more risk. While the healthy firms have DistressRisk
values essentially equal to zero, the ailing firms have an average DistressRisk value of about
5.9% and the distressed firms have an average value of about 53.4%.
Table 2 finally shows that the median firm has a total assets value (Assets) of about $251
million and a market capitalization (Equity) of about $203 million. Conversely, its book-to-
market ratio (BookToMarket) is about 53%, while its property, plant, and equipment-to-total
assets ratio (PP&E ) is about 22%. In comparison to the CRSP-Compustat universe, our
sample composition is therefore skewed towards larger firms, primarily owing to the fact that
larger firms are more likely to own more than one segment than smaller firms.
Figure 2 shows the cumulative percentage-point changes in FirmRisk over several future
periods separately for high and low distress risk firms. At the end of each fiscal year in our
sample period, we classify firms as high or low distress risk based on DistressRisk, using the
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sixth decile of the DistressRisk distribution as breakpoint.19 We then calculate each firm’s
cumulative change in FirmRisk over periods extending up to ten years into the future by
compounding annual changes. We finally average the firm-specific changes first by fiscal year
end, look-ahead period, and high or low distress risk and then by look-ahead period and high
or low distress risk. The figure suggests a positive relation between ex-ante DistressRisk and
ex-post FirmRisk. In particular, while the low distress risk firms do not significantly raise
their FirmRisk over the five or ten years after portfolio formation, the high distress risk firms
significantly raise theirs by 1.2 and 1.6 percentage points over those periods, respectively.
Reversing the exercise, we next classify firms based on whether their changes in FirmRisk
over the prior five years are above or below the median change at the end of a fiscal year. Using
the same methodology as above, we then study the evolutions of the average DistressRisk of
these two types of firms over periods extending up to ten years into the future. Untabulated
tests suggest a positive relation between ex-ante FirmRisk and ex-post DistressRisk. In
particular, the firms with an above-median past increase in FirmRisk observe a two (six)
percentage points greater increase in their average DistressRisk over the first five (ten) years
after portfolio formation than the firms with a below-median past increase.
Our two sorting exercises illustrate why it is so difficult to establish the causal relation
between distress risk and risk-taking. While the distress risk sort suggests that a high distress
risk leads firms to raise their risk, the sort based on past changes in firm risk suggests that
risk-taking leads to increases in future distress risk. Standard tests are thus unable to determine
whether it is a high distress risk that causes risk-taking or whether it is risk-taking that causes
high distress risk. In addition, standard tests are also unable to rule out that both distress risk
and risk-taking are driven by an omitted third variable (“endogeneity problem”).
19The low distress risk firms are thus identical to our healthy firms. We do not distinguish between ailing and
distressed firms in the figure to avoid overcrowding it. Separately considering the latter firms, the distressed
firms produce insignificantly more positive future changes in FirmRisk than the ailing firms.
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5.3 Does Distress Risk Cause Risk-Shifting?
5.3.a. The Effect of Hurricane Strikes on Distress Risk
In this section, we study whether distress risk causes industrial firms to take on more risk and,
if it does, whether the risk-taking translates into risk-shifting. We start by offering evidence
that hurricanes significantly raise distress risk, as required by the inclusion restriction. To do so,
Figure 3 plots the average of DistressRisk for the hurricane-struck firms and the matched
controls over a period starting from one year before a strike to three years after, with event
month zero being the strike month. To avoid survivorship bias, we use all firm-year observations
with non-missing DistressRisk in the figure. Also, since firms do not know ex-ante whether
they will be struck again after event month zero, we allow for other hurricanes in the post-event
period, but, to be consistent with our main tests, not in the pre-event period.20
Figure 3 suggests that hurricane strikes significantly raise the distress risk of the hurricane-
struck firms relative to the distress risk of the controls. While the hurricane-struck firms and
the controls have a similar and only insignificantly different mean distress risk of about six
to seven percent before a strike, the mean distress risk of the hurricane-struck firms sharply
rises starting from the strike month, with it increasing from 7.5% one month before a strike to
11.4% two, and a maximum of 14.3% nine, months after. Conversely, the mean distress risk of
the controls rises only mildly, from 6.3% one month before a strike to a maximum of 8.3% nine
months after. Crucially, the difference in mean distress risk between the two types of firms
is usually significant over the first nine months after a strike, as suggested by the confidence
bands in the figure. Starting from nine months after a strike, the mean distress risk of the
hurricane-struck firms begins declining again. Importantly, however, it remains well above the
mean distress risk range of these firms before a strike. Also, it remains well above the mean
distress risk of the controls after a strike, with the difference between the two types of firms
still being significant 36 months after a strike. Overall, hurricanes thus do not only have a
20Excluding firms that are struck again after event month zero has virtually no effect on the figure.
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Figure 3. The Effect of Hurricane Strikes on Distress Risk The figure plots the mean DistressRisk
of hurricane-struck firms and matched non-hurricane-struck firms over a four-year period surrounding a
hurricane strike. The broken lines are 95% confidence bands. We first average DistressRisk by hurricane
season, event month, and distress risk group and then by event month and distress risk group alone.
significant, but also a persistent, effect on the distress risk of hurricane-struck firms.
5.3.b. The Causal Effect of Distress Risk on Risk-Taking
In this section, we use differences tests to study whether distress risk causes firms to take on more
risk. To achieve this goal, Table 3 offers the results of differences tests calculated from sample
means, with Panel A looking at FirmRisk and Panel B at InvestmentRisk. The rows of the
table show means calculated separately for the hurricane-struck firms (Treated = 1) and the
matched controls (Treated = 0) and the two years before a strike year (After = 0) and the
two years after (After = 1). Conversely, the columns show means calculated separately for
the healthy (Healthy = 1), ailing (Ailing = 1), and distressed (Distressed = 1) firms.
Table 3 About Here
Panel A of Table 3 suggests that, over the two years before a hurricane strike, the healthy,
ailing, and distressed hurricane-struck firms have an average operating segment portfolio risk
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(FirmRisk) of 30.2%, 28.5%, and 30.4%, respectively. Comparing these numbers with averages
calculated over the two years after a strike, both the healthy and distressed hurricane-struck
firms observe only insignificant changes in their average operating segment portfolio risk, with
the average risk of the healthy firms rising by 0.2 percentage points and the average risk
of the distressed firms falling by 0.3 points. In stark contrast, the average risk of the ailing
hurricane-struck firms rises significantly by 1.2 points (p-value: 0.014). In comparison, the
mean risk of the non-hurricane-struck firms rises by between 0.2 to 0.4 points from the two
years before a strike to the two years after, suggesting that the healthy hurricane-struck firms
behave similarly to firms not exposed to an exogenous increase in distress risk.
A concern with the changes in FirmRisk in Panel A is that they may not be caused by
deliberate managerial actions, but by the hurricanes themselves. If tangible assets were, for
example, both less risky and more susceptible to hurricane damages than intangible assets,
then hurricanes could directly cause the changes in FirmRisk if ailing firms were also more
tangible-asset intensive than other firms. Hurricanes could also directly cause the changes in
FirmRisk if the ailing firms’ core segments were both more affected by hurricanes due to a
greater proximity to the firms’ headquarters, but also less risky than their newer segments,
perhaps due to pre-hurricane-strike risk-shifting. Fortunately, using our alternative risk proxy
InvestmentRisk, which is calculated from managers’ actual investments into segments and is
thus immune to the direct effects caused by hurricanes, we are able to immediately rule out this
concern. In particular, Panel B of Table 3 suggests that the changes in InvestmentRisk observed
by the differently distressed hurricane-struck or non-hurricane-struck firms are similar to their
corresponding changes in FirmRisk in Panel A. For example, the average new real-assets
portfolio risk of the ailing hurricane-struck firms rises by about 1.2 percentage points from
before a hurricane strike to after (p-value: 0.002), which is virtually identical to these firms’
increase in average operating segment portfolio risk over the same period.
To calculate DIDID estimates, we first take the difference between the change in FirmRisk
28
of the ailing hurricane-struck firms from before a hurricane strike to after and the change of the
healthy hurricane-struck firms over the same period. The result is a significant 0.92 (p-value:
0.072; see Panel A). Repeating the calculations using non-hurricane-struck firms, we obtain
an insignificant estimate of 0.04. Subtracting 0.04 from 0.92, we obtain a significant DIDID
estimate for the ailing firms’ FirmRisk of 0.88 (p-value: 0.078). Swapping the ailing firms for the
distressed firms and redoing the above calculations, we obtain an insignificant DIDID estimate
for the distressed firms’ FirmRisk of –0.74. Turning to the other risk proxy, InvestmentRisk,
we obtain a significant DIDID estimate for the ailing firms of 1.15 (p-value: 0.014), but an
insignificant DIDID estimate for the distressed firms of –0.50 (see Panel B).
In Table 4, we repeat the DIDID calculations using regressions featuring control variables
and firm- and year-fixed-effects (see Equation (6)). The model estimated in columns (1) to
(3) uses FirmRisk as dependent variable, while the model estimated in columns (4) to (6)
uses InvestmentRisk. Supporting the sample-mean based evidence, the table suggests that
the ailing firms significantly raise both their FirmRisk and InvestmentRisk in response to a
hurricane strike. In particular, the coefficient on the triple interaction involving Ailing, which
is the DIDID estimate for the ailing firms, is a highly significant 0.86 in the model explaining
FirmRisk (p-value: 0.018) and a highly significant 1.24 in the model explaining InvestmentRisk
(p-value: 0.002). In contrast, the distressed firms decrease their risk in the same situation, with,
however, only the decrease in FirmRisk being significant. In particular, the coefficient on the
triple interaction involving Distressed, which is the DIDID estimate for the distressed firms,
is a significant –1.13 in the model explaining FirmRisk (p-value: 0.040), but an insignificant
–0.58 in the model explaining InvestmentRisk. Of the control variables, we find some evidence
suggesting that both risk proxies decrease with Size and PP&E.
Table 4 About Here
A remaining concern with our results in Tables 3 and 4 is that the healthy, ailing, and
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distressed firms may not only differ along the distress risk dimension, but also along other
dimensions, possibly biasing our estimates. To mitigate this concern, we next repeat the DIDID
regressions on a PS-matched sample, ensuring that the differently distressed firms are similar
in terms of their size, age, asset tangibility, and industry composition. Table 5 shows that, while
the PS-matched sample contains only about 14,000 observations compared to about 26,000 in
our original sample, it yields inferences in complete agreement with those produced by our
original sample. In particular, the DIDID regressions on the PS-matched sample also suggest
that the ailing firms significantly raise both their FirmRisk and InvestmentRisk in response to a
hurricane strike, while the distressed firms decrease theirs. Different from before, the decreases in
the risk proxies observed by the distressed firms are, however, both insignificant now.
Table 5 About Here
In sum, our differences analysis suggests an inverted U-shaped relation between distress
risk and risk-taking, with only the ailing, but not the distressed, firms reacting to a hurricane
strike by taking on more risk. In fact, if anything, the distressed firms seem to react by lowering
their risk. Importantly, the risk-taking of the ailing firms is not only statistically, but also
economically, significant, with their changes in both FirmRisk and InvestmentRisk lying above
the 90th percentiles of the full-sample distributions of changes in the variables. We will shed
more light on the behavior of the distressed firms later on in the paper.
5.3.c. How Do the Ailing Firms Take On More Risk?
We next study how the ailing hurricane-struck firms take on more risk. Viewing a firm as a
portfolio of operating segments, a firm can raise its risk by shifting towards riskier assets, either
by opening up or expanding high-risk segments or by closing down or contracting low-risk
segments. Alternatively, the firm can shift towards more correlated assets, for example, by
lowering the number of segments owned by it. To identify which of these strategies are used
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by the ailing hurricane-struck firms, we reestimate DIDID regression (6) using Capex, Focus,
NumberSegments, Cash, and AcquisitionExpense as new dependent variables.
Table 6 About Here
Column (1) of Table 6 suggests that the ailing hurricane-struck firms tend to raise their
capital expenditures from before to after a hurricane strike, with these firms’ DIDID estimate on
Capex being a significant 0.023 (p-value: 0.037). Some of the extra capital expenditures appear
to be used to change the firms’ business orientation. Column (2), for example, suggests that
the ailing hurricane-struck firms tend to become about twelve percentage points more likely to
change their two-digit SIC focus (p-value: 0.033) after a strike, while column (3) suggests that
they close an average of one-fifth of a segment (p-value: 0.017). Importantly, however, column (4)
offers no evidence suggesting that the firms close down segments to start hoarding cash, refuting
the concern that our risk-taking evidence is spuriously driven by our risk proxies not taking cash
balances into account. Similarly, column (5) offers no evidence suggesting that the risk-taking
of the ailing hurricane-struck firms is facilitated through M&A activity.21
Table 6 further shows that the distressed hurricane-struck firms also tend to restructure
themselves after a hurricane strike. In particular, while we find no evidence that these firms
change their number of segments, they become almost 30 percentage points more likely to
change their two-digit SIC focus (p-value: 0.002). Moreover, our evidence also suggests that
they start running down their cash balances after a strike (p-value: 0.001).
21To offer further evidence on M&As, we have also used SDC Platinum deals data excluding exchange
offers and share buybacks to study whether hurricane strikes affect a firm’s propensity to act as acquirer or
target in an M&A deal. Separately considering mergers and acquisitions and firm-initiated and non-firm-
initated deals, we have calculated the number of deals in which a firm is involved over the two years before a
hurricane strike and the two years after and then averaged over the differently-distressed hurricane-struck or
non-hurricane-struck firms. Our results suggest that, while hurricane-struck firms tend to become significantly
less likely to acquire other firms after a strike, the other probabilities do not significantly change.
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Overall, our conclusion is that the changes in FirmRisk and InvestmentRisk of the ailing and
distressed firms found in Section 5.3.b. are attributable to these firms refocussing themselves,
with the ailing, but not the distressed, firms closing down segments in that process. While
the ailing firms, however, tend to refocus themselves towards segments raising their risk, the
distressed firms tend to refocus themselves towards segments lowering their risk.
5.3.d. Does the Ailing Firms’ Risk-Taking Hurt Their Creditors?
Our evidence so far suggests that ailing firms take on more risk in response to distress risk
increases induced through hurricane strikes. We now offer evidence from three further tests
suggesting that this behavior hurts the ailing firms’ creditors through lowering the value of
their positions, indicating that the ailing firms not only raise risk, but, in fact, risk-shift.
In our first test, we show that the ailing firms make value-reducing investment decisions to
raise their risk, lowering their investment efficiency and the chance that they can repay their
creditors in the future. To do so, Table 7 offers the results from reestimating DIDID regression (6)
using AverageQFirm or AverageQNewAssets as new dependent variables. Columns (2) and (5)
show that the ailing firms skew their asset mixes and their new real-assets portfolios towards
segments with lower average Qs — and thus worse growth opportunities — after a hurricane
strike. In particular, the coefficient on the triple interaction involving Ailing is –0.38 in the
model explaining AverageQFirm (p-value: 0.000), while it is –0.33 in the model explaining
AverageQNewAssets (p-value: 0.002). Conversely, columns (3) and (6) show that the distressed
firms skew their asset mixes and new real-assets portfolios towards segments with higher
average Qs — and thus better growth opportunities — in the same situation. In particular,
the coefficient on the triple interaction involving Distressed is 0.23 in the model explaining
AverageQFirm (p-value: 0.203), while it is 0.34 in the model explaining AverageQNewAssets (p-
value: 0.074). Different from the ailing firms, the distressed firms thus improve their investment
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efficiency after a strike, increasing their ability to repay their creditors in the future.
Table 7 About Here
In our second test, we show that hurricanes prompt ailing firms to invest into segments not
only characterized by few growth opportunities, but also a tendency to raise failure risk. To
achieve this goal, Figure 4 plots cumulative failure rates for the matched non-hurricane-struck
firms (Panel A) and the hurricane-struck firms (Panel B) from the start of the third fiscal year
after a hurricane strike to eight years into the future, in both cases separately reporting failure
rates for healthy, ailing, and distressed firms.22 Starting with the non-hurricane-struck firms,
Panel A of Figure 4 suggests that a higher Merton (1974) DistressRisk value in event year –1
leads to a higher failure probability in event years +3 to +10, consistent with these firms not
changing their risk in event years 0 to +2.23 In contrast, Panel B suggests that, despite having
an only moderate DistressRisk value in event year –1, the ailing hurricane-struck firms are
marginally more likely to fail than the distressed hurricane-struck firms over event years +3 to
+10, consistent with them significantly raising their risk in event years 0 to +2.
More specifically, while about 23% of the ailing non-hurricane-struck firms fail until the
end of event year +10, about 33% of the distressed non-hurricane-struck firms do so, too, with
the difference in failure rates across these two groups of firms being highly significant (p-value:
0.000). Further, while about 35% of the ailing hurricane-struck firms fail until the end of event
year +10, only about 29% of the distressed hurricane-struck firms do so, too, with the difference
22We start the calculation of the failure rates from event year +3 since our restriction that a firm must
have complete data over a hurricane’s event period from event year –2 to +2 to be included in our differences
tests implies that there are no failures over event years +1 and +2.
23This result is consistent with the findings of, for example, Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Aretz, Florackis,
and Kostakis (2017), which show that, in general, a higher Merton (1974) default probability at the end of
month t leads to a higher probability of a firm failing starting from the beginning of month t+ 1.
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Figure 4. Failure Rates The figure plots cumulative failure rates for the matched non-hurricane-struck
firms (Panel A) and the hurricane-struck firms (Panel B) over event years +3 to +10, separately reporting
the failure rates for healthy, ailing, and distressed firms. The healthy (ailing) [distressed] firms are firms with
a DistressRisk value below the sixth decile (between the sixth and ninth deciles) [above the ninth decile] at
the end of event year –1 (i.e., the year before the hurricane-strike year). We define failures as bankruptcy
filings, performance-related stock market delistings, and distressed mergers (defined in Section 4.).
in failure rates across these two groups of firms being insignificant. Finally, the difference in
failure rates between the ailing hurricane-struck firms and the ailing non-hurricane-struck
firms is again highly significant (p-value: 0.038). Overall, our conclusion is that the risk-taking
of the ailing firms in response to a hurricane strike leads to a statistically and economically
meaningful increase in their average failure risk of above ten percentage points, significantly
decreasing the chance that these firms can repay their creditors in the future.
In our final test, we study why the distressed firms respond so differently to a hurricane strike
relative to the ailing firms, to provide one last piece of evidence that the ailing firms’ risk-taking
hurts their creditors. Chava and Roberts (2008) show that creditors actively intervene in the
investment decisions of firms that have violated financial covenants in the past. Relatedly, Gilje
(2016) shows that creditor control induced through covenant violations may explain why oil and
gas firms lower their risk in response to exogenous increases in their leverage. We thus speculate
that creditor control induced through covenant violations also prevents distressed, but not
ailing, firms from raising their risk after a hurricane strike. Using covenant violation data from
1996 to 2011 from Michael Roberts’ website,24 we find some initial evidence consistent with
24The URL address is: <http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/∼mrrobert/>.
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this hypothesis. While only about 18% of the ailing firms have violated covenants over event
years –2 and –1, about 52% of the distressed firms have done so, too, suggesting that distressed
firms are far more likely to be under creditor control than ailing firms.
More importantly, we next rerun DIDID regression (6) on FirmRisk and InvestmentRisk
separately using either the subsample of ailing firms that have complied with their covenants
over event years –2 and –1 or the subsample of ailing firms that have violated some of their
covenants over that period as treatment group. Noting that the covenant data begin after
the start of our original sample period (1996 vs. 1992), we use a two-year look-back period
to identify covenant violations to keep our sample period as long as possible. Also, since the
distressed firm portfolio contains too few firms to be split, we drop these firms and all variables
involving Distressed from the regression.25 Table 8 shows the results from these regressions,
with columns (1) and (4) offering the full-sample results, columns (2) and (5) those using the
ailing compliers, and columns (3) and (6) those using the ailing violators.
Table 8 About Here
While the full sample in Table 8 contains only about 19,000 observations compared to
about 26,000 in our original tests, columns (1) and (4) corroborate the result that ailing firms
raise their risk after a hurricane strike, while distressed firms either do not change their risk or
decrease it. More importantly, the table also offers strong evidence suggesting that covenant
violations condition the effect of distress risk on risk-taking. While the ailing compliers in
25Also splitting the distressed firms into two groups based on whether they have violated financial covenants
over event years –2 and –1 and separately running DIDID regression (6) using either the ailing and distressed
compliers or the ailing and distressed violators as treatment groups, we are, unfortunately, not able to identify
all coefficients associated with the distressed firms. However, adding the distressed compliers to the ailing
compliers, and the distressed violators to the ailing violators and running DIDID regression (6) excluding all
variables involving Distressed, we find results identical to those shown in the paper.
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columns (2) and (5) significantly raise their risk after a strike, the ailing violators in columns
(3) and (6) do not change or significantly decrease theirs. For example, while the coefficient on
the triple interaction in the model explaining FirmRisk is 1.02 for the ailing compliers (p-value:
0.007; see column (2)), the same coefficient is –2.16 for the ailing violators (p-value: 0.006;
column (3)). Thus, in line with Pryshchepa, Aretz, and Banerjee (2013), creditor control seems
to prevent ailing or distressed firms from taking on more risk due to high distress risk. Also,
since the response of the ailing violators reflects creditors’ optimal response to a hurricane
strike, the risk-taking of the ailing compliers is unlikely to be in creditors’ interest.
Overall, our evidence thus not only suggests that ailing firms raise their risk in response
to a hurricane strike, but also that they do so through making value-reducing investments
significantly boosting their failure risk and lowering the chance that they can repay their
creditors in the future. Conversely, if anything, distressed firms decrease their risk through
making value-enhancing investments not altering their failure risk in the same situation. More
directly indicating that the ailing firms’ behavior is suboptimal for their creditors, our evidence
also suggests that ailing firms controlled by creditors do not change or even decrease their risk
after a strike, while ailing firms still acting in shareholders’ interest raise their risk.
6. Robustness Tests
In this section, we show the results of robustness tests. We start with parallel trends tests. We
next rerun DIDID regression (6) using alternatively calculated risk proxies. We then show that
hurricane strikes do not systematically distort the volatilities of the pure-play firm industry
portfolios. We also offer evidence suggesting that our result that ailing firms risk-shift in
response to a hurricane strike is driven by those ailing firms not insured against hurricane
strikes. We finally calculate bootstrap p-values for the triple interactions involving Ailing and
Distressed in the DIDID regressions explaining FirmRisk and InvestmentRisk.
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6.1 Parallel Trends Tests
Differences tests rely on the assumption that subjects are randomly assigned to treatment. To
test this assumption, Table 9 compares changes in several analysis variables between hurricane-
struck vs. non-hurricane-struck firms (Panel A), ailing vs. healthy firms (Panel B), and distressed
vs. healthy firms (Panel C) over two pre-hurricane periods. The analysis variables are FirmRisk,
InvestmentRisk, DistressRisk, BookToMarket, Capex, and PP&E. The pre-hurricane periods
are the two-year and five-year periods before the hurricane-strike year. The table suggests
that neither pair observes significantly different changes in the analysis variables. For example,
hurricane-struck and non-hurricane-struck firms observe similar changes in FirmRisk and
InvestmentRisk over the two periods, with no difference being significant. So do the healthy
and ailing — or, alternatively, distressed — firms, except that distressed firms observe slightly
larger increases in FirmRisk than healthy firms over the two-year period.26
Table 9 About Here
Despite the parallel-trends test results, there could still be concern that the healthy, ailing,
and distressed firms differ along dimensions other than distress risk. To mitigate this concern,
we have rerun our analyses on a PS-matched sample ensuring that the differently distressed
firms do not differ across observables other than distress risk. We discuss the results from
reestimating our regressions explaining FirmRisk and InvestmentRisk on the PS-matched
sample in Section 5.3.b. and report them in Table 5. We offer the results from reestimating
the other regressions on the PS-matched sample in the Internet Appendix. Reassuringly, the
PS-matched sample consistently yields conclusions identical to those in the paper.
26We have also compared the industry compositions of the distress risk groups. Our evidence suggests
that similar proportions of the healthy, ailing, and distressed firms belong to each one-digit SIC industry. For
example, 42.3% (42.5%) [38.9%] of the healthy (ailing) [distressed] firms are manufacturing firms. Differences
in the proportions across the different distress risk groups are, in general, not significant.
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6.2 Alternative Risk Proxies
In this section, we use alternative versions of our risk proxies to reassess whether firms raise
their risk after a hurricane strike, reporting the results from reestimating DIDID regression (6)
on the alternative versions of the risk proxies in Table 10. A concern with our first risk proxy,
FirmRisk, is that it uses a segment’s book value of assets to determine the segment’s weight in
an operating segment portfolio. This may be problematic since the book value of assets does not
only change with managerial decisions, but also due to accounting rules. Accounting rules, for
example, mandate that a segment’s profit over a fiscal year is added to its book value of assets at
the end of the year. To mitigate this concern, we have recalculated FirmRisk using a segment’s
sales, recognizing that sales values are less affected by accounting rules than asset values. Using
this alterative version of FirmRisk in DIDID regression (6), column (1) of Table 10 suggests
that ailing firms still significantly raise their firm risk after a hurricane strike, while distressed
firms still significantly decrease theirs (p-values: 0.005 and 0.027, respectively).
Table 10 About Here
A second concern is that financial leverage may vary significantly across the pure-play firm
industries, spuriously raising our estimates of the asset volatilities of high-leverage industries
relative to those of low-leverage industries. To mitigate this concern, we have recalculated
the volatilities and covariances of the pure-play firm industry portfolios from delevered
stock returns, using the Merton (1974) model to delever stock returns.27 Using versions of
FirmRisk and InvestmentRisk derived from the delevered industry portfolio returns in DIDID
regression (6), columns (2) and (3) continue to suggest that ailing firms significantly raise their
firm- and investment-risk after a hurricane strike (p-values: 0.051 and 0.034, respectively), while
27Merton’s (1974) model suggests that we are able to calculate delevered stock returns using (Ei,t/Ai,t)×
(1/N [d1;i,t]) ×rE,i, where rE,i is firm i’s stock return and other variables are defined as before.
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distressed firms significantly lower theirs (p-values: 0.007 and 0.020, respectively).
A final concern is that a firm’s segment holdings must have a higher volatility than a well-
diversified portfolio of pure-play firms operating in the segment’s industry since the firm does
not benefit from diversification. To address this concern, we have recalculated the volatilities
of the pure-play firm industry portfolios as value-weighted averages of the volatilities of the
firms in the portfolios. Doing so, we effectively assume that the stock returns of all firms in a
pure-play firm industry portfolio are perfectly positively correlated, eliminating diversification
benefits. Using versions of FirmRisk and InvestmentRisk net of diversification benefits in
DIDID regression (6), columns (4) and (5) continue to suggest that ailing firms significantly
raise their risks after a hurricane strike (p-values: 0.051 and 0.017, respectively), while distressed
firms sometimes significantly lower theirs (p-values: 0.026 and 0.160, respectively).
6.3 The Effect of Hurricane Strikes on Segment Volatilities
In this section, we investigate the concern that our tests only spuriously suggest that hurricane
strikes prompt ailing firms to take on more risk because hurricane strikes change the variance-
covariance matrix of the pure-play firm industry portfolios. If hurricane strikes, for example,
transformed pre-hurricane-strike high-risk industries into post-hurricane-strike low-risk in-
dustries, and vice versa, the ailing firms would actually decrease their risk in response to a
hurricane strike, and not increase it. To alleviate this concern, we form pure-play firm industry
portfolios using only pure-play firms located in hurricane-struck areas over a hurricane’s
event period. In the Internet Appendix, we then offer the results from various tests, including
the Friedman (1937) test, suggesting that the ranking of the industries according to their
volatilities does not significantly change from the pre- to the post-hurricane period.
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6.4 The Effect of Hurricane Strike Insurance
In this section, we offer evidence that our main conclusions continue to hold if we eliminate firms
possibly insured against hurricane strikes from our analysis. To do so, we split the hurricane-
struck firms into those that received at least one positive settlement payment (Compustat
item: setp) over the two or ten years after a hurricane strike and those that did not. Given
that settlement payments include non-insurance-related payments, we cannot be reasonable
sure that the firms that received at least one positive payment were insured. In contrast, we
can, however, be reasonably sure that the firms that never received a positive payment were
uninsured. Rerunning DIDID regression (6) on the subsample of uninsured firms, our results
again suggest that ailing, but not distressed, firms raise their firm- and investment-risk in
response to a hurricane strike. The details are in the Internet Appendix.
6.5 Bootstrap Tests
We finally conduct a bootstrap experiment, with the dual purpose of verifying our asymptotic
inferences, but also as falsification test. To do so, we randomly reshuffle the identity of the
treated (hurricane-struck) firms across the full sample of treated firms and matched controls
per hurricane season. For example, if there are 22 treated firms and 187 controls in a hurricane
season, we first pool the firms and then randomly assign treatment status to 22, with each
firm being equally likely to be assigned. Using the bootstrapped version of Treated, we next
repeat DIDID regression (6) on either FirmRisk or InvestmentRisk. We repeat these steps
10,000 times, each time recording the coefficients on the triple interactions.
Figure 5 shows the bootstrap distributions for the coefficients on the triple interactions
involving Ailing (Panel A) and Distressed (Panel B) from the DIDID regression explaining
FirmRisk (columns (1) to (3) in Table 4). Panel A suggests that a coefficient on the triple
interaction involving Ailing of 0.86 is unlikely to occur under the null hypothesis since only
3.3% of the bootstrapped coefficients are more extreme than 0.86. Conversely, Panel B suggests
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Figure 5. Bootstrap Tests The figure shows the bootstrap distributions for the coefficients on the triple
interactions involving Ailing (Panel A) and Distressed (Panel B) from DIDID regression (6) explaining
FirmRisk. We create the bootstrap distributions from 10,000 bootstrap experiments, with each experiment
randomly reshuffling the identity of the hurricane-struck firms per hurricane season.
that a coefficient on the triple interaction involving Distressed of –1.13 is not unlikely to occur
since 26.7% of the bootstrapped coefficients are more extreme than –1.13. While not shown,
the corresponding percentages from the DIDID regression explaining InvestmentRisk (columns
(4) to (6) in Table 4) are 0.40% and 57.8%, respectively. The bootstrap thus confirms that
only ailing, but not distressed firms, take on more risk after a hurricane strike.
We have also calculated bootstrap inferences for the coefficients on the triple interactions
in the DIDID regressions in Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8. In general, the bootstrap inferences align
with our parametric inferences. The only exception is the coefficient on the tripe interaction
involving Ailing in the model explaining Cash (column (4) in Table 6), which is no longer
significant at conventional confidence levels using the bootstrap inferences.
7. Conclusion
We study whether industrial firms raise their risk in response to exogenous distress risk increases
induced through hurricane strikes. Using two new risk proxies reflecting deliberate managerial
decisions to change the risk of a firm’s operating segment portfolio or of its new real-assets
portfolio in differences tests, we offer evidence that only ailing, but not distressed, firms take
on more risk in such situations. Studying how the ailing firms take on more risk, we find
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that they reorientate themselves towards their higher-risk segments, closing down lower-risk
segments in the process. Looking at real consequences, we show that the ailing firms take on
more risk by making value-reducing and failure-risk-increasing investments into segments with
few growth opportunities. We also contrast the ailing firms’ response to a hurricane strike with
the response of distressed firms, showing, first, that distressed, but not ailing, firms are often
under creditor control induced through covenant violations and, second, that only covenant
compliers, and not covenant violators, raise their risk after a hurricane strike. While other
studies have already shown that exogenous increases in distress risk can lead industrial firms
to raise their risk, our evidence is important since it not only implies that some firms raise
their risk in such situations, but also that they hurt their creditors in doing so. Thus, we do
not only offer positive evidence of risk-taking, but, ultimately, of risk-shifting.
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics for our analysis variables, including the number of observations (Obs), the
mean (Mean), the standard deviation (SD), the tenth (P10), 25th (P25), 50th (P50), 75th (P75), and 90th (P90)
percentiles. In case of FirmRisk, InvestmentRisk, and DistressRisk, we report the descriptive statistics separately
for the full sample (“Full”), the healthy-firm subsample (“Healthy”), the ailing-firm subsample (“Ailing”), and
the distressed-firm subsample (“Distressed”). Healthy (ailing) [distressed] firms have a DistressRisk value below
the sixth decile (between the sixth and the ninth deciles) [above the ninth decile] at the end of one of the fiscal
years in our sample period. More details about the analysis variables are in Table A.1 in the Appendix. To ease
interpretation, the table reports Assets and Equity in millions of U.S. dollars (and not logged).
Sample Obs Mean SD P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
FirmRisk (%) Full 18,702 29.70 5.77 22.81 25.91 29.11 33.39 37.91
Healthy 10,429 29.27 5.72 22.51 25.48 28.63 33.14 37.21
Ailing 6,653 30.09 5.68 23.30 26.24 29.59 33.70 38.14
Distressed 1,620 30.85 6.22 23.50 26.50 30.57 34.88 39.02
InvestmentRisk (%) Full 17,155 29.95 5.85 22.98 26.11 29.35 33.70 38.28
Healthy 9,599 29.47 5.77 22.54 25.66 28.71 33.39 37.62
Ailing 6,076 30.37 5.78 23.32 26.30 30.00 34.02 38.54
Distressed 1,480 31.36 6.24 23.77 26.97 31.01 35.54 39.40
DistressRisk (%) Full 18,702 6.73 18.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.65 22.99
Healthy 10,429 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ailing 6,653 5.90 11.92 0.00 0.01 0.37 5.65 20.22
Distressed 1,620 53.43 29.39 9.42 30.31 55.51 78.68 92.93
Equity (MLN$) Full 18,702 1,689 4,382 15 48 203 1,036 3,950
Assets (MLN$) Full 18,702 1,982 5,515 20 56 251 1,189 4,352
PP&E Full 18,702 0.295 0.256 0.048 0.109 0.224 0.405 0.645
BookToMarket Full 18,702 0.671 0.648 0.141 0.299 0.526 0.877 1.400
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Table 3. The Effect of Distress Risk on Risk-Taking: ANOVA Tests
This table presents the averages of FirmRisk (Panel A) and InvestmentRisk (Panel B) separately by distress
risk group, hurricane-struck or non-hurricane-struck firms, and the pre-hurricane or post-hurricane period. We use
distress risk values from the end of the fiscal year before the hurricane strike to sort firms into portfolios: “Healthy”
contains those firms with a distress risk value below the sixth decile, “Ailing” those firms with a distress risk value
between the sixth and the ninth decile, and “Distressed” those firms with a distress risk value above the ninth
decile. The hurricane-struck firms are those located in a hurricane-struck county over the period in which the
hurricane struck the county (“struck”); the matched control firms are those located in a non-hurricane-struck
county over matched periods (“controls”). “Before strike (–2 to –1)” reports the average of the risk proxies taken
over the ends of the two fiscal years before a hurricane-strike year, “After strike (+1 to +2)” over the ends of the
two fiscal years after. The table also reports the difference in the risk proxies between the three different distress
risk groups (Differences) and the changes in the risk proxies from before a strike to after (After–Before). “***”,
“**”, and “*” indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels, respectively.
Distress Risk Groups Differences
Hurricane Healthy Ailing Distressed
Struck (1) (2) (3) (2)–(1) (3)–(1)
Panel A: Firm Risk
Before Strike (–2 to –1) Struck 30.16 28.46 30.42
Controls 29.14 30.09 31.10
After Strike (+1 to +2) Struck 30.41 29.63 30.12
Controls 29.32 30.31 31.46
After–Before Struck 0.25 1.17** –0.31 0.92* –0.56
Controls 0.18*** 0.22*** 0.37** 0.04 0.18
Panel B: Investment Risk
Before Strike (–2 to –1) Struck 30.63 28.78 31.27
Controls 29.34 30.32 31.50
After Strike (+1 to +2) Struck 30.68 29.98 31.13
Controls 29.51 30.50 31.99
After–Before Struck 0.05 1.20*** –0.13 1.15** –0.19
Controls 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.49** 0.00 0.31
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Table 4. The Effect of Distress Risk on Risk-Taking: Regression Results
This table presents the results from the DIDID regression:
RiskProxyi,t = αi,k + αt,k + β
′Distressi,t × Treatedi,t ×Afteri,t + γ′Distressi,t × Treatedi,t
+ δ′Distressi,t ×Afteri,t + η′Distressi,t ⊗Xi,t + εi,t,
where RiskProxy is FirmRisk in columns (1) to (3), and InvestmentRisk in columns (4) to (6). Treated is a
dummy variable equal to one for firm-year observations associated with firms located in a hurricane-struck county
over the five year-period surrounding a hurricane strike and zero for matched control firm-year observations. After
is a dummy variable equal to one for treated and matched firm-year observations after a hurricane strike and else
zero. X is a vector of control variables, including Assets, PP&E, and PP&E 2. We sort firms into distress risk
portfolios using DistressRisk at the end of the fiscal year before a hurricane strike: Healthy firms have a distress
risk value below the sixth decile; ailing firms have a distress risk value between the sixth and the ninth decile; and
distressed firms have a distress risk value above the ninth decile. Distressi,t is a vector containing one, a dummy
variable equal to one for ailing firms and else zero (Ailing), and a dummy variable equal to one for distressed firms
and else zero (Distressed). αi,k and αt,k are firm-distress portfolio- and year-distress portfolio-fixed effects. β, γ,
δ, and η are free parameters. More details about the analysis variables are in Table A.1 in the Appendix. For
each firm, we include the two observations before a hurricane strike and the two after. The table shows parameter
estimates and standard errors (in parentheses). Standard errors are calculated from White’s (1980) formula. “***”,
“**”, and “*” indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable
Firm Risk Investment Risk
Independent Variable Interacted With
Ailing Distressed Ailing Distressed
One Dummy Dummy One Dummy Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated × After 0.084 0.861** –1.127** –0.062 1.243*** –0.583
(0.151) (0.365) (0.548) (0.184) (0.410) (0.686)
Treated –0.081 –1.797** –0.261 –0.029 –2.579*** –0.858
(0.295) (0.793) (1.199) (0.325) (0.898) (1.821)
After –0.028 0.006 0.749*** 0.000 –0.017 0.794***
(0.031) (0.055) (0.246) (0.033) (0.061) (0.269)
Assets –0.181*** 0.016 –0.485 –0.193*** 0.040 –0.686*
(0.046) (0.086) (0.316) (0.047) (0.091) (0.377)
PP&E –1.388*** 0.016 0.533 –1.762*** 0.040 0.170
(0.410) (0.086) (0.660) (0.420) (0.091) (0.705)
PP&E2 1.161*** –0.658 0.370 1.27*** –0.242 0.057
(0.305) (0.459) (1.144) (0.322) (0.493) (1.214)
Observations 27,387 25,196
Adjusted R-squared 0.892 0.885
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Table 5. The Effect of Distress Risk on Risk-Taking: PS-Matched Sample Regression Results
This table presents the results from the DIDID regression:
RiskProxyi,t = αi,k + αt,k + β
′Distressi,t × Treatedi,t ×Afteri,t + γ′Distressi,t × Treatedi,t
+ δ′Distressi,t ×Afteri,t + η′Distressi,t ⊗Xi,t + εi,t,
where RiskProxy is FirmRisk in columns (1) to (3), and InvestmentRisk in columns (4) to (6). Treated is a
dummy variable equal to one for firm-year observations associated with firms located in a hurricane-struck county
over the five year-period surrounding a hurricane strike and zero for matched control firm-year observations. After
is a dummy variable equal to one for treated and matched firm-year observations after a hurricane strike and else
zero. X is a vector of control variables, including Assets, PP&E, and PP&E 2. We sort firms into distress risk
portfolios using DistressRisk at the end of the fiscal year before a hurricane strike: Healthy firms have a distress
risk value below the sixth decile; ailing firms have a distress risk value between the sixth and the ninth decile; and
distressed firms have a distress risk value above the ninth decile. Distressi,t is a vector containing one, a dummy
variable equal to one for ailing firms and else zero (Ailing), and a dummy variable equal to one for distressed firms
and else zero (Distressed). αi,k and αt,k are firm-distress portfolio- and year-distress portfolio-fixed effects. β, γ,
δ, and η are free parameters. More details about the analysis variables are in Table A.1 in the Appendix. We
estimate the regressions on a propensity-score (PS) matched sample. To do so, we use a logit model to estimate
the probability that a firm has a DistressRisk value above the sixth decile, using Assets, Age, and PP&E as
covariates. The logit model is estimated separately by one-digit SIC industry, using only data from the fiscal year
before the hurricane strikes. We next match each firm with a DistressRisk value above the sixth decile with that
below-sixth-decile value firm with the closest fitted value and from the same one-digit SIC industry. For each firm,
we include the two observations before a hurricane strike and the two after. The table shows parameter estimates
and standard errors (in parentheses). Standard errors are calculated from White’s (1980) formula. “***”, “**”,
and “*” indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable
Firm Risk Investment Risk
Independent Variable Interacted With
Ailing Distressed Ailing Distressed
One Dummy Dummy One Dummy Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated × After 0.153 1.287** –0.409 0.037 1.679*** –0.626
(0.270) (0.514) (0.554) (0.269) (0.524) (0.801)
Treated 1.251 –4.079** –0.777 1.024 –4.408*** –1.031
(1.011) (1.660) (1.492) (1.153) (1.707) (2.051)
After –0.11* 0.090 0.283* –0.099* 0.066 0.435**
(0.058) (0.074) (0.167) (0.060) (0.081) (0.177)
Assets –0.238*** 0.063 1.804* –0.377*** 0.248* –0.482
(0.089) (0.121) (0.968) (0.098) (0.132) (1.023)
PP&E –2.895*** 1.804* 1.492 –2.059*** –0.482 0.954
(0.779) (0.968) (1.862) (0.777) (1.023) (1.993)
PP&E2 2.044*** –1.408** –0.885 1.622*** 0.060 –0.422
(0.575) (0.703) (1.507) (0.594) (0.788) (1.599)
Observations 13,912 13,888
Adjusted R-squared 0.893 0.877
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Table 6. Risk-Taking Channels: Regression Results
This table presents the results from the DIDID regression:
RiskChanneli,t = αi,k + αt,k + β
′Distressi,t × Treatedi,t ×Afteri,t + γ′Distressi,t × Treatedi,t
+ δ′Distressi,t ×Afteri,t + η′Distressi,t ⊗Xi,t + εi,t,
where RiskChannel is either Capex, Focus, NumberSegments, Cash, or AcquisitionExpense. Capex is capital
expenditures scaled by total assets. Focus is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm’s maximum-sales segment
changes its two-digit SIC code over the current fiscal year, else zero. NumberSegments is the number of segments
owned by a firm. Cash is cash and equivalents scaled by total assets. AcquisitionExpense is acquisition expenditures
scaled by total assets. Treated is a dummy variable equal to one for firm-year observations associated with firms
located in a hurricane-struck county over the five year-period surrounding a hurricane strike and zero for matched
control firm-year observations. After is a dummy variable equal to one for treated and matched firm-year
observations after a hurricane strike and else zero. X is a vector of control variables, including Assets, PP&E, and
PP&E 2. We sort firms into distress risk portfolios using DistressRisk at the end of the fiscal year before a hurricane
strike: Healthy firms have a distress risk value below the sixth decile; ailing firms have a distress risk value between
the sixth and the ninth decile; and distressed firms have a distress risk value above the ninth decile. Distressi,t
is a vector containing one, a dummy variable equal to one for ailing firms and else zero (Ailing), and a dummy
variable equal to one for distressed firms and else zero (Distressed). αi,k and αt,k are firm-distress portfolio- and
year-distress portfolio-fixed effects. β, γ, δ, and η are free parameters. More details about the analysis variables
are in Table A.1 in the Appendix. For each firm, we include the two observations before a hurricane strike and
the two after. The table shows parameter estimates and standard errors (in parentheses), suppressing, however,
estimates and standard errors for the control variables in X. Standard errors are calculated from White’s (1980)
formula. “***”, “**”, and “*” indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively.
Number Acquisition
Capex Focus Segments Cash Expense
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treated × After × Ailing 0.023** 0.117** –0.210** 0.000 –0.014
(0.011) (0.055) (0.088) (0.021) (0.058)
Treated × After × Distressed 0.027 0.290*** 0.126 –0.059*** –0.028
(0.017) (0.093) (0.184) (0.018) (0.046)
Treated × After –0.018*** –0.058* 0.070 0.010 0.024
(0.006) (0.034) (0.061) (0.011) (0.032)
Treated × Ailing –0.055*** –0.16* –0.304* 0.052** 0.145**
(0.019) (0.084) (0.178) (0.025) (0.062)
Treated × Distressed –0.009 –0.383 –0.973*** 0.139*** 0.147
(0.017) (0.499) (0.365) (0.041) (0.158)
After × Ailing 0.001 –0.011 0.002 0.024*** –0.025**
(0.001) (0.010) (0.019) (0.004) (0.011)
After × Distressed 0.007** 0.034 –0.086*** 0.021*** –0.075***
(0.003) (0.021) (0.032) (0.008) (0.021)
Treated 0.016* 0.042 0.238** –0.006 –0.041
(0.009) (0.035) (0.108) (0.013) (0.031)
After –0.002*** –0.002 0.007 –0.012*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.006) (0.012) (0.002) (0.006)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 29,041 29,836 29,836 29,301 29,166
Adjusted R-squared 0.548 0.275 0.752 0.650 0.258
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Table 7. Investment Efficiency: Regression Results
This table presents the results from the DIDID regression:
AverageQi,t = αi,k + αt,k + β
′Distressi,t × Treatedi,t ×Afteri,t + γ′Distressi,t × Treatedi,t
+ δ′Distressi,t ×Afteri,t + η′Distressi,t ⊗Xi,t + εi,t,
where AverageQ is AverageQFirm in columns (1) to (3), and AverageQNewAssets in columns (4) to (6). Treated
is a dummy variable equal to one for firm-year observations associated with firms located in a hurricane-struck
county over the five year-period surrounding a hurricane strike and zero for matched control firm-year observations.
After is a dummy variable equal to one for treated and matched firm-year observations after a hurricane strike and
else zero. X is a vector of control variables, including Assets, PP&E, and PP&E 2. We sort firms into distress risk
portfolios using DistressRisk at the end of the fiscal year before a hurricane strike: Healthy firms have a distress
risk value below the sixth decile; ailing firms have a distress risk value between the sixth and the ninth decile; and
distressed firms have a distress risk value above the ninth decile. Distressi,t is a vector containing one, a dummy
variable equal to one for ailing firms and else zero (Ailing), and a dummy variable equal to one for distressed firms
and else zero (Distressed). αi,k and αt,k are firm-distress portfolio- and year-distress portfolio-fixed effects. β, γ,
δ, and η are free parameters. More details about the analysis variables are in Table A.1 in the Appendix. For
each firm, we include the two observations before a hurricane strike and the two after. The table shows parameter
estimates and standard errors (in parentheses). Standard errors are calculated from White’s (1980) formula. “***”,
“**”, and “*” indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable
Average QFirm Average QNewAssets
Independent Variable Interacted With
Ailing Distressed Ailing Distressed
One Dummy Dummy One Dummy Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated × After 0.115* –0.383*** 0.228 0.084 –0.326*** 0.338*
(0.065) (0.106) (0.179) (0.067) (0.107) (0.189)
Treated –0.016 0.047 0.000 –0.036 –0.022 0.000
(0.083) (0.118) (0.000) (0.082) (0.120) (0.000)
After –0.031*** 0.029 0.013 –0.038** 0.038 0.051
(0.015) (0.023) (0.050) (0.016) (0.025) (0.063)
Assets –0.103*** 0.037 0.044 –0.054** 0.026 0.040
(0.019) (0.030) (0.048) (0.021) (0.033) (0.060)
PP&E –0.294 0.792*** 0.78** –0.494*** 0.844*** 0.827**
(0.181) (0.246) (0.317) (0.192) (0.264) (0.339)
PP&E2 0.322*** –0.572*** –0.503** 0.44*** –0.655*** –0.514**
(0.125) (0.167) (0.210) (0.132) (0.175) (0.218)
Observations 24,648 22,642

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 10. Robustness Tests: Regression Results
This table presents the results from the DIDID regression:
RiskProxyalti,t = αi,k + αt,k + β
′Distressi,t × Treatedi,t ×Afteri,t + γ′Distressi,t × Treatedi,t
+ δ′Distressi,t ×Afteri,t + η′Distressi,t ⊗Xi,t + εi,t,
where RiskProxyalt is an alternatively calculated version of FirmRisk or InvestmentRisk. Sales-weighted firm
risk is identical to FirmRisk, except that we use a segment’s sales as weight. The delevered risk proxies are
identical to the original ones, except that we calculate the variance-covariance matrix of the segments from delevered
pure-play firm returns. The no diversification risk proxies are identical to the original ones, except that we calculate
the volatilities of the pure-play firm industry portfolios as value-weighted averages of firm volatilities. Treated
is a dummy variable equal to one for firm-year observations associated with firms located in a hurricane-struck
county over the five year-period surrounding a hurricane strike and zero for matched control firm-year observations.
After is a dummy variable equal to one for treated and matched firm-year observations after a hurricane strike
and else zero. X is a vector of control variables, including Assets, PP&E, and PP&E 2. We sort firms into distress
risk portfolios using DistressRisk at the end of the fiscal year before a hurricane strike: Healthy firms have a
distress risk value below the sixth decile; ailing firms have a distress risk value between the sixth and the ninth
decile; and distressed firms have a distress risk value above the ninth decile. Distressi,t is a vector containing
one, a dummy variable equal to one for ailing firms and else zero (Ailing), and a dummy variable equal to one for
distressed firms and else zero (Distressed). αi,k and αt,k are firm-distress portfolio- and year-distress portfolio-fixed
effects. β, γ, δ, and η are free parameters. More details about the analysis variables are in Table A.1 in the
Appendix. For each firm, we include the two observations before a hurricane strike and the two after. The table
shows parameter estimates and standard errors (in parentheses), suppressing, however, estimates and standard
errors for the control variables in X. Standard errors are calculated from White’s (1980) formula. “***”, “**”, and
“*” indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively.
Sales No Pure-Play
Weighted Delevered No Pure-Play Diversification
Firm Delevered Investment Diversification Investment
Risk Firm Risk Risk Firm Risk Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treated × After × Ailing 1.055*** 0.619* 0.784** 0.885* 1.319**
(0.375) (0.317) (0.369) (0.452) (0.555)
Treated × After × Distressed –1.122** –1.309*** –0.963** –1.824** –1.424
(0.507) (0.488) (0.414) (0.823) (1.013)
Treated × After –0.211 –0.480* –0.459 0.231 –0.075
(0.303) (0.264) (0.281) (0.221) (0.251)
Treated × Ailing –0.073** –0.016 –0.000 –2.979*** –3.709***
(0.029) (0.025) (0.027) (1.202) (1.336)
Treated × Distressed 0.012 0.231 0.138 –0.845 0.501
(0.142) (0.153) (0.191) (1.694) (3.081)
After × Ailing –1.475* –0.996 –2.155*** 0.060 0.042
(0.798) (0.713) (0.808) (0.084) (0.095)
After × Distressed –2.567 0.895 –1.784** 1.150*** 1.222***
(1.600) (1.055) (0.848) (0.387) (0.410)
Treated 0.101* –0.006 0.020 –0.566 –0.612
(0.054) (0.044) (0.050) (0.468) (0.507)
After 0.959*** 0.661*** 0.687*** –0.077 –0.065
(0.243) (0.206) (0.216) (0.048) (0.049)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 27,387 29,209 26,813 27,387 25,196
Adjusted R-squared 0.899 0.876 0.863 0.900 0.893
